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Dept considers it too early to draw firm conclusions regarding possibility basic changes in Soviet foreign policy following summit collapse. Apparent, however, Soviets intend to exploit vigorously U-2 incident in attempt to neutralize or eliminate US and NATO base systems abroad, to weaken free world alliances, and to discredit US leadership. A specific aim is to make impossible any reconnaissance flights along periphery as well as over Soviet territory. Major tactic is to threaten dire consequences to attend any sort of violation Soviet air space.

Khrushchev set line May 9 by threatening Soviet recket strike at bases from which planes flew in event U-2 flights repeated. Threat has been sustained by Soviets and made more specific by Harshal Malinevsky May 30.

Malinevsky stated orders had been given to recket troop 'commander, Marshal Medelin, to fire if aircraft "violates space Soviet Union and socialist countries." Khrushchev confirmed Malinevsky's statement in June 3 press conference. Can be expected Soviets will utilise. Powers trial (reportedly to be held soon) and scheduled September session UNGA to keep threats alive.

SiEUR: SOV: JAArmitage:ms 5/6/60

Telegraphic transmission and

The Secretary

Commen EUR - Mr. Davis

NEA - Mr. Elting

FE - Mr. Steeves INR - Mr. Crawford S/B - Mr. Bohlen
M - Mr. Herchant

SOV - Mr. McSweeney S/S - Mr. McElhiney

P - Mr. Berding

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US has stated (White's press conference May 10) Soviet threat is attempt to intimidate blameless governments and that US will stand by its commitments to protect threatened allied countries. White reaffirmed statement June 1 following Malinovsky's speech.

Soviets hope to create and sustain high degree tension on issue in order to generate pressures on governments concerned. Dept intends refrain from further public responses at this time and to urge similar course on allies in belief such responses would assist Soviet campaign to keep issue alive.

Dept recognizes, however, some measure legitimate concern of governments of threatened countries. Appropriate officers addressee Missions, therefore, authorized, in conversations to discuss if Missions consider it appropriate, taxtizance/with leading government officials/
Soviet threats along following lines, avoiding emphasizing Soviet threats or reflecting undua concern.

US does not believe Soviets have delegated to subordinate military official power of decision on launching rockets. Soviets well aware such action would not involve bi-lateral military engagement with any country concerned but would call into play commitments of powerful allies those countries and entail serious risk of global nuclear war. Soviets have acted with great caution whenever such risks involved. If Soviets should, in fact, decide to commence nuclear war they would not do so on feeble pretext of border violation by unarmed plane nor by bi-lateral action against one neighboring country. Initial strike would be aimed at those with principal retaliatory power.

US convinced Soviets do not/desire initiate nuclear war. Not only do free world powers possess power to inflict damage on Soviet Union much greater than Soviets



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would consider "tolerable," they dispose greater striking power than USSR in absolute FYI terms. /If it should appear particularly useful, we would be prepared at appropriate time to give Japanese and Pakistan top-level officials military briefings to substantiate our confidence in Western deterrent power.

It is very ties of collective defense system which contribute to this free world capability that Soviets hope to loosen. Soviets would then be freer to exert pressures and threats on neighboring countries without having to consider strength their allies.

Malinovsky also claimed Soviet "radio and technical" capability to locate take-off and landing points and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and technical capability to locate take-off and landing points and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and technical capability to locate take-off and landing points and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and technical capability to locate take-off and landing points and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and landing points and to track any reconnaissance aircraft near Soviet borders. Next numbered telegram individual accommentation and landing points are also accommentation and landing points are also accommentation and landing points and landing points are also accommentation and landing points

Fact Soviet threats are essentially propaganda does not preclude fact they are reckless and irresponsible and intentionally designed to heighten tensions and worsen international relations. Difficult to reconcile them with Soviet pretensions to seek reasonable settlements of major international issues and deplorable that they create worst type climate in which to discuss seriously problems of arms limitation.

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